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Abstract
In two experiments, predictions from the discrepancy-plus-search view (e.g.,
McDaniel & Einstein, 2000) were tested against predictions from the familiarity view
(McDaniel, 1995) and the preparatory attentional and memory processes theory (PAM;
Smith, 2003). Discrepancy was manipulated by mismatching the actual and the
expected category typicality of PM targets while familiarity was manipulated by the
category typicality of PM targets alone. Consistent with PAM’s prediction, higher PM
performance with significant monitoring was found in the conditions where typical
category exemplars served as nontargets. While the significant monitoring limited the
opportunity for discrepancy to facilitate PM performance, further analyses hinted at a
potential effect of discrepancy on PM performance. The implications of the findings
are discussed under several theoretical frameworks.
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Typical PM targets are not typically better than atypical PM targets:
Potential mechanisms of Prospective Memory retrieval
Prospective memory (PM) refers to memory for future actions. Real life
examples of PM include remembering to pack one’s memory stick for a conference, to
deliver a message to a colleague, or to pick up cookies for kids on the way home from
work. As described by the examples, human life is filled with various PM tasks.
In spite of the importance of successfully performing various PM tasks in
everyday life, people often experience failures of PM tasks: we give a presentation
without any slides because we forgot to pack the memory stick, and apologize to our
colleague because we forgot to deliver the message and so forth. In general, PM tasks
are challenging despite the fact that we perform them every day. Typically, a PM task
is defined as performing an intended action when a pre-determined stimulus, a PM
target, appears to signal the appropriate time to perform the intended action. For
example, you may plan to pack your memory stick with data so that you can give it to
your friend when you meet him at a conference. At a conference, while you are
engaged in a stimulating conversation with other colleagues, your friend comes up to
the group and quickly joins the conversation. To perform the PM task of giving the
memory stick to your friend, in the absence of explicit retrieval request, you somehow
have to recognize that your friend’s face is the PM target, signaling the appropriate
time to complete the PM task. Since you were not thinking about giving the memory
stick to your friend when he joined the conversation, it is challenging to recognize
that a stimulus (e.g., your friend’s face) presented in the middle of ongoing activities
is the PM target. In addition to the recognition of PM target, one has to retrieve the
PM intention associated with the PM target to successfully perform the PM task.
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Many theorists have proposed potential mechanisms that may support PM
performance (e.g., McDaniel, 1995; McDaniel & Einstein, 2000; McDaniel &
Einstein, 2007; McDaniel, Guynn, Einstein, & Breneiser, 2004; Smith, 2003; Smith,
Hunt, McVay, & McConnell, 2007). Following, I consider three possible mechanisms
that may explain how people recognize the PM target and retrieve the PM intention.
The preparatory attentional and memory processes (PAM) theory (Smith, 2003;
Smith & Bayen, 2004; Smith et al., 2007) states that PM performance is facilitated by
two processes: monitoring processes and memory processes. Smith and colleagues
argue that the monitoring processes help one to search for the PM target while the
memory processes support recognition of the PM target and retention of the PM
intention. Furthermore, they claim that the monitoring processes are resourceconsuming and obligatory for successful PM performance. According to the PAM
theory, the resource-consuming, obligatory monitoring processes are implicated by
the relative slowing down of the ongoing activity during a PM block of trials, in
which participants have a PM intention in addition to the ongoing activity, compared
to a control block of trials, in which participants have only the task demand for the
ongoing activity. The PAM theory terms this relative slowing down as monitoring cost
and predicts that it should precede any successful PM performance.
Contrary to the PAM theory’s (Smith, 2003; Smith & Bayen, 2004; Smith et
al., 2007) account of the obligatory monitoring for successful PM performance, the
multi-process theory (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000, McDaniel et al., 2004) argues that
spontaneous retrieval can support some PM performance in the absence of monitoring
cost. According to the multi-process theory, constantly engaging in resourceconsuming monitoring processes is not likely to be functional given the limited
2

capacity of our mental resources. McDaniel and colleagues suggest that spontaneous
retrieval may facilitate the recognition of PM target and the retrieval of PM intention
under some circumstances (e.g. “focal” tasks; Scullin, McDaniel, Shelton, & Lee,
2010), whereas the resource-consuming monitoring may do so under other
circumstances (e.g., “nonfocal” tasks; Scullin et al.).
As a potential underlying mechanism of spontaneous retrieval, McDaniel
(1995, McDaniel & Einstein, 2000) has suggested the familiarity view. According to
the familiarity view, when an item is perceived with high familiarity under the context
of a PM task, one may interpret the high familiarity of that item as indicating
significance. One explanation for the source of high familiarity of the PM target is a
fluency-driven familiarity account (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Jacoby, 1983; Jacoby &
Whitehouse, 1989). Jacoby and colleagues argue that people may utilize processing
fluency of an item as a basis for the familiarity judgment of that item, such that people
often judge fluently processed stimuli more familiar than less fluently processed
stimuli. Given that PM targets are processed during the instruction for a PM task prior
to the PM task itself, when the PM targets are later encountered during the PM task, it
is likely that those PM targets could be processed more fluently, either perceptually or
conceptually or both, than nontargets (which were not processed during the PM
instruction). If so, people may judge the PM target more familiar than the nontargets,
that are less fluently processed, during the ongoing activity. Consequently, one might
interpret the PM target as bearing significance, which would then initiate a search for
the source of the significance. This search then may lead to the recognition of the item
as a PM target and the retrieval of PM intention.
Although the familiarity view (McDaniel, 1995) nicely describes how high
3

familiarity of PM target can lead to the recognition of PM target and the retrieval of
PM intention, the familiarity view fails to provide a complete account of PM
performance. If only a PM target can have high familiarity, people could use the high
familiarity as a basis for the significance judgment of the PM target. Going back to
the previous example of packing the memory stick, imagine that the memory stick is
on the desk with a couple of new toys your child left after his play. In this scenario,
your memory stick is an object you encounter every day and you encoded as PM
target. Thus, you will find the memory stick highly familiar. On the other hand, your
child’s new toys, serving as nontargets in this scenario, are not so familiar to you.
Being the only object with high familiarity, the high familiarity of your memory stick
may signal the significance of the memory stick. While it is possible that for some PM
tasks the PM target is the only highly familiar item, often, the PM target is not the
only highly familiar item as people continuously process items with varying degrees
of familiarity. If the high familiarity of PM target cannot signal significance of the PM
target, no search for the source of that significance will be initiated, making the
retrieval of PM intention unlikely. Indeed, familiar PM targets do not always lead to
higher PM performance than unfamiliar PM targets (e.g., McDaniel & Einstein, 1993).
To account for the lack of diagnosticity of familiarity as a potential source of
significance for PM targets (McDaniel, 1995), the discrepancy-plus-search view has
been proposed by McDaniel and colleagues (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000; McDaniel et
al., 2004). According to Whittlesea and Williams (1998, 2001a, 2001b), people
constantly evaluate the quality of their mental processing and make predictions about
it based on their knowledge and experience. When the actual processing quality
matches with what was expected, no discrepancy is signaled. But, when the actual
4

processing quality mismatches with what was expected, discrepancy is signaled.
When discrepancy is signaled, the cognitive system detects it. When discrepancy is
detected by the system, an attribution is made to resolve discrepancy. For example,
one may have a certain level of expected processing quality for the face of his
colleague: higher than that for the face of a stranger but lower than that for the face of
his child. If he finds the actual processing fluency of the colleague’s face match to the
expected, no discrepancy will be signaled. However, if he finds the actual processing
quality of the colleague’s face higher than that of his own child’s face (because he
thought about the project he is working on with the colleague), the expected quality
will then mismatch; at this point discrepancy will be signaled and an attribution will
be made. Whittlesea and Williams suggest that this attribution can vary widely, such
that discrepancy can be attributed as indicating familiarity or attractiveness of the
discrepant item depending on the context. Many studies have found support for the
discrepancy attribution framework by showing that discrepant stimuli are judged to be
more familiar (e.g., Whittlelsea & Williams, 1998, 2001a), more preferable (Willems
& van der Linden, 2007), more true (Hansen, Dechene, & Wanke, 2008) depending
on different task contexts.
According to McDaniel and colleagues (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000;
McDaniel et al., 2004), in the context of the PM task discrepancy from an item (e.g.,
PM target) may signal the significance of that item. Hence, the discrepancy-plussearch view suggests that the discrepancy of a PM target leads to the recognition of
PM target and the retrieval of PM intention. For example, you are supposed to send an
email to your colleague you met at a conference. Back in your office, you flip through
the list of conference attendees, which is full of familiar names, while adding in
5

references to your draft for a book chapter. According to the familiarity view
(McDaniel, 1995), given that nontargets (the names of other conference attendees) are
highly familiar, familiarity of the PM target (the name of your colleague who asked
you to send an email) would not signal any significance of the PM target. However,
according to the discrepancy-plus-search view, as long as the actual processing quality
mismatches the expected processing quality and signals discrepancy, a PM target
surrounded by highly familiar nontargets can be recognized as something significant.
Going back to the example, forming the PM intention of sending an email to the
colleague may lead you to more fluently process the colleague’s name when you see
the colleague’s name on the list, more so than what you would normally expect from
reading the name. This mismatch may then signal discrepancy, which could be
attributed to the significance of the item. Once the item is perceived to be significant,
the search for the source of that significance will be initiated, possibly leading to the
recognition of PM target and the retrieval of PM intention.
Another unique prediction from the discrepancy-plus-search view (McDaniel
& Einstein, 2000; McDaniel et al., 2004) is that a PM target with low familiarity can
lead to higher PM performance if that PM target elicits discrepancy, even compared to
a PM target with high familiarity, if the latter does not elicit any discrepancy. This
prediction is in stark contrast with the prediction made by the familiarity view of
which states higher PM performance for a PM target with high familiarity than a PM
target with low familiarity (McDaniel, 1995). For example, now you are asked to send
an email to a foreign scholar you met at a very selective conference. When you flip
through the list of conference attendees, it is likely that the foreign scholar’s name
will read less fluently than other names, as most of them are your collaborators.
6

According to the familiarity view, given that the nontargets are highly familiar, the
relatively unfamiliar PM target, the foreign scholar’s name, would not be able to
signal the significance of the PM target in this example. However, the discrepancyplus-search view makes a different prediction. Given that the expected processing
quality of the list of conference attendees is set at “easy” after reading many familiar
names from the list, when the foreign scholar’s unfamiliar name appears, the actual
processing quality of “difficult” would mismatch with the expected. This mismatch,
then, will signal discrepancy, leading one to make an attribution of significance of the
name.
Some studies have found preliminary support for the discrepancy-plussearch view. Guynn and McDaniel (2007) found higher PM performance for
participants who were pre-exposed to the PM targets during the study period prior to
the PM instruction (pre-exposure group) than for participants who were not preexposed to the PM targets prior to the PM instruction (no pre-exposure group). The
discrepancy-plus-search view’s interpretation of the results is that the pre-exposure of
the PM targets led to the much more fluent processing of PM targets compared to that
of nontargets. Because participants presumably developed the expected processing
quality for the PM targets based on the less fluent processing of nontargets, the
processing fluency of PM targets mismatched with expected fluency. This mismatch
could have signaled discrepancy, possibly facilitating the PM performance in the preexposure group. On the other hand, in the no pre-exposure condition, processing
fluency of the PM targets could have been comparable to that of the nontargets,
signaling no discrepancy. One shortcoming of this study was that the presumed
discrepancy was potentially confounded with familiarity: the familiarity view could
7

explain high PM performance in the pre-exposure condition compared to the no preexposure condition because pre-exposure would have increased familiarity.
To further disentangle the discrepancy-plus-search view from the familiarity
view, several studies have been conducted (e.g., Brenieser & McDaniel, 2006; Lee &
McDaniel, 2010). With an anagram solution task as their ongoing task, Lee and
McDaniel manipulated discrepancy by matching or mismatching the actual anagram
solution difficulty of PM targets to the expected solution difficulty of PM targets. In
the nondiscrepant conditions, the solution difficulty of PM targets matched that of the
list of anagrams the PM targets were embedded in (e.g., easy PM targets embedded in
the easy list or vice versa). In the discrepant conditions, the solution difficulty of PM
targets mismatched that of the list of anagrams in which the PM targets were
embedded (e.g., difficult PM targets embedded in the easy list or vice versa). The
reasoning was that by solving a list of anagrams with a certain level of solution
difficulty (e.g., easy), one would build an expectation about the solution difficulty of
the subsequent anagram (easy). If the solution difficulty of PM target (easy) matched
the expectation, no discrepancy would be signaled. If the solution difficulty of PM
target mismatched, such that a difficult anagram was presented as a PM target after
one built an expectation of easy anagrams, discrepancy would be signaled. Supporting
the notion that discrepancy facilitates PM performance, Lee and McDaniel found that
the PM performance was higher if the solution difficulty of PM targets was different
from that of the list than if the difficulty was the same with that of the list. The
familiarity view (McDaniel, 1995) predicted higher PM performance for the easy PM
targets than the difficult PM targets because more fluent processing of the easy PM
targets will presumably be interpreted as indicating high familiarity of those PM
8

targets. However, the familiarity view was not supported as there was no main effect
of solution difficulty of PM target. Also, given that relatively high PM performance
across all the conditions (Ms>.80) was not preceded by any significant monitoring
cost, no support was found for the PAM theory (which argues for resource-consuming,
obligatory monitoring for successful PM performance, Smith, 2003; Smith & Bayen,
2004; Smith et al., 2007).
While the results of previously discussed studies have been suggestive of
discrepancy-plus-search processes, there have been only a few studies conducted to
investigate the function of discrepancy on PM performance and the findings have
been somewhat inconclusive (e.g., Breneiser & McDaniel, 2006; Guynn & McDaniel,
2007, Einstein et al., 2005; Lee & McDaniel, 2010). To obtain more conclusive
evidence for the discrepancy-plus-search view on PM, we wanted to extend the
findings from Lee and McDaniel. With regard to Lee and McDaniel, there is a
possible concern with their use of the anagram solution task as the ongoing activity.
Given the relatively longer time frame for solving the anagrams (2-3 sec for the easy
anagrams and 4-5 sec for the difficult anagrams), participants could have engaged in
monitoring, rather than utilizing discrepancy, to perform the PM task. Even if more
monitoring was found in the discrepant conditions, this argument of participants
potentially engaging in monitoring is insufficient support for the PAM theory (Smith,
2003, Smith & Bayen, 2004), as the theory fails to explain why participants would
have monitored more only in the discrepant conditions. Still, if participants engaged
in monitoring in the discrepant conditions during Lee and McDaniel’s study, it would
be difficult to argue that their anagram paradigm captured the pure influence of
discrepancy on PM performance. Thus, we wanted to employ a task that has a
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relatively short time frame so that the related RT measure is sensitive enough to detect
the monitoring cost if participants decide to engage in strategic monitoring. Also, for
further generalization of discrepancy, we wanted to manipulate discrepancy by using
fluency-driven familiarity other than that of the anagram solution difficulty.
For several reasons we chose a category judgment task as the ongoing activity.
People can make category judgments in a matter of hundred milliseconds (msec).
Thus, with the much shorter time frame, we have a more sensitive measure for
potential monitoring cost. Another factor is the graded structure of categories (e.g.,
Rosch & Mervis, 1975). One of the classic findings in categorization literature is that
exemplars from the same category differ in their category typicality: one may think
“water” is a better example of category “liquid” than “blood” with both “water” and
“blood” being legitimate examples of the category “liquid”. This category typicality
difference among exemplars is implicated in differential response times in tasks that
require accessing category information, such as a category judgment task. Studies
have found that people are faster and more accurate in processing typical exemplars
than atypical exemplars (e.g., Collin & Quillian, 1969; Rosch, Simpson, & Miller,
1976). Given that typical and atypical exemplars are processed with different fluency
levels, the category judgment task with typical and atypical exemplars seemed
suitable to elicit discrepancy for our study.
More specifically, we could elicit discrepancy by intermixing typical and
atypical exemplars. For example, if a participant were to be presented with a list of
very typical nontarget exemplars for a category judgment task, one after another, he
would experience a certain level of fluency associated with the category judgment
task and may expect the next exemplar will be processed at the fluency level he
10

experienced (e.g., very typical, hence, very fluent). If a typical PM target exemplar
was next presented, the actual processing quality and the expected would match,
signaling no discrepancy (nondiscrepant condition). However, if the same typical PM
target exemplar was presented within a list of atypical nontarget exemplars, the
processing quality would mismatch with the expected, thereby signaling discrepancy
(discrepant condition). This discrepancy then may lead to an attribution of
significance of the PM target, in turn stimulating the recognition of the PM target and
the retrieval of PM intention associated with the PM target. Another pair of
nondiscrepant and discrepant conditions was constructed by using the atypical PM
targets and atypical and typical nontargets, respectively. The discrepancy-plus-search
view (Einstein & McDaniel, 2000; McDaniel et al., 2004) predicts higher PM
performance in the discrepant conditions compared to the nondiscrepant conditions.
More specifically, this view predicts the cross-over interaction of the typicality of PM
target exemplars and that of nontarget exemplars, such that, PM targets that have the
mismatching typicality relative to nontargets will lead to higher PM performance than
PM targets that have the matching typicality to nontargets. Furthermore, given that
discrepancy-plus-search processes are assumed to support spontaneous retrieval, no
monitoring is necessary to facilitate PM performance in the discrepant conditions.
On the other hand, the familiarity view (McDaniel, 1995) predicts no
differential performance between the discrepant and the nondiscrepant conditions.
According to this view, the fluent processing of typical PM target exemplars is
interpreted as high familiarity of those PM target exemplars; thus, high PM
performance is expected for the typical PM target exemplars compared to the atypical
PM target exemplars. Moreover, the familiarity view also does not predict any
11

significant monitoring cost to precede PM performance as the familiarity view
proposes that familiarity is a potential mechanism that supports spontaneous retrieval.
Contrary to the familiarity (McDaniel, 1995) and the discrepancy-plus-search
views (Einstein & McDaniel, 2000; McDaniel et al., 2004), the PAM theory (Smith,
2003; Smith & Bayen, 2004; Smith et al., 2007) predicts that a significant monitoring
cost will be observed for PM blocks of trials. Also, it further predicts no differential
PM performance between typical versus atypical PM targets. It is possible for PAM
theory to argue that typical PM target exemplars will lead to higher PM performance
than atypical PM target exemplars as the recognition of the former may be easier.
However, when only a small number of PM targets are used, it is unlikely that the
difficulty in the recognition and monitoring processes will differ between the PM
target exemplars with different typicality. Furthermore, the PAM theory predicts that
PM performance for the same PM targets should not differ based on the typicality of
nontarget exemplars.
Experiment 1
In this experiment, we manipulated the typicality of PM target exemplars and
nontarget exemplars to elicit discrepancy. While we wanted to maximize the
discrepancy by increasing the difference between the different category typicality
levels, we tried to make sure that the difference was not too obvious to participants.
Our concern was that if the difference is too obvious, participants may recognize
discrepancy is experienced because the PM target exemplar has a category typicality
different from nontargets. If so, discrepancy may not lead to the attribution of
significance of PM target. Hence, rather than selecting the most typical and atypical
exemplars from a category, for our atypical exemplars, we used the exemplars from
12

the third, instead of the fourth, quartile of typical exemplars of a category.
In addition to manipulating discrepancy, we implemented two features to
control for possible ceiling effects in PM performance. In PM laboratory paradigms,
PM performance is often at the ceiling hindering the observation and the
interpretation of influence of any IVs on PM performance. To avoid this potential
ceiling, first, we chose three PM targets. We reasoned that, with three PM targets, we
may potentially increase the difficulty of the PM task. Secondly, we constructed the
PM instruction in a manner that did not specify the context in which PM targets
would appear. Marsh, Hicks and Bink (2006) reported selective monitoring behaviors
when the PM context was specified. When Marsh and colleagues told their
participants that PM targets will appear only during the second lexical decision task,
their participants showed monitoring cost only during that second lexical decision
task. Though the PM instruction was provided prior to all lexical decision tasks, these
participants did not show any monitoring cost during the first lexical decision task
when compared to the participants in the control group who were not asked to
perform any PM task. We reasoned that if the context in which PM targets appear is
not specified, participant cannot selectively engage in monitoring. For example, upon
receiving the PM instruction not specifying the PM context, people may initiate
monitoring. And suppose that PM targets appear in the latter of the two distinctive
tasks following the PM instruction, such as a lexical decision task and a category
judgment task. By the time participants perform the category judgment task, they may
be less likely to stay engaged in any monitoring that was initiated upon receiving the
PM instruction and maintained during the lexical decision task. The more likely
people disengage from monitoring, the more likely discrepancy may facilitate PM
13

performance. Thus, as a distractor task, a lexical decision task always followed the
PM instruction, preceding the category judgment task in which PM targets appeared.
Also, to measure monitoring cost, participants will receive a PM block and a control
block of lexical decision and category judgment tasks. By comparing the mean
response time of category judgments in the PM block to that in the control block, we
may examine monitoring cost associated with PM task.
Methods
Participants and design. Seventy eight participants were recruited from the
Washington University in St. Louis community and participated in the experiment in
exchange for a partial course credit or monetary compensation. The experiment was a
2 x 2 x 2 mixed factorial design, with the category typicality of the PM target
exemplar (PM target typicality, typical vs. atypical) and the category typicality of the
nontarget exemplar (nontarget typicality, typical vs. atypical) as between subjects
factors and the block type (PM vs. control) as a within subjects factor. The
presentation order of block was counterbalanced so that a half of the participants first
received the PM block and the other half first received the control block.
Materials. Two separate sets of stimuli were used, one for the lexical decision
task and another for the category decision task. For the lexical decision task (which
was used as a distractor task) a set of six hundred items was used (for further
information, see Exp. 4 in Scullin et al., 2010). The set of six hundred items was
divided into two subsets for a lexical decision task in each block, the PM and the
control block. The order in which each subset was assigned to a certain block was
counterbalanced. A half of each subset was words and the other half was nonwords.
All of the items were 4-8 letters long and pronounceable.
14

For the category decision task, 49 categories were selected from Van
Overschelde, Rawson, and Dunlosky’s (2004) updated and expanded Battig and
Montague’s norm (1969): 3 categories for the PM targets and 46 categories for the
nontargets were used. From each of the 49 categories, all of the exemplars were
ordered according to their category typicality and divided at the median typicality into
the “typical subset” and the “atypical subset”. Then, the four most typical exemplars
from the typical subset were picked to serve as “typical exemplars”. The four most
typical exemplars from the atypical subset were picked to serve as “atypical
exemplars”. Pilot studies were conducted to validate this manipulation of category
typicality of PM target and nontarget exemplars and found that people were faster at
judging the “typical exemplar” belongs to a given category than the “atypical
exemplar” and rating the “typical exemplars” more typical of a certain category than
the “atypical exemplars”. All of the exemplars were nouns. The mean length and the
mean log-transformed Hyperspace Analogue to Language (HAL) frequency were 5.55
letters and 9.24 for the typical nontarget exemplars and 5.60 letters and 8.55 for the
atypical nontarget exemplars, respectively.
From each of the three PM target categories (musical instrument,
transportation vehicle, relative), we picked one PM target, for a total of three PM
targets. The most typical exemplar among the “typical subset” from each of the PM
target category was drawn to serve as “typical PM target exemplars” (drum, bus,
uncle). The most atypical exemplars among the “atypical subset” from the same
categories were drawn to serve as “atypical PM target exemplars” (harp, taxi,
grandparent). The mean length and the mean HAL frequency were 4 letters and 9.60
for the typical PM targets and 6.33 letters and 6.86 for the atypical PM targets,
15

respectively. Each of the three PM targets was randomly presented on the 31st, the
55th, and the 84th trial in the PM block.
The rest 46 (out of 49) categories were used to generate nontargets. All four
exemplars from the “typical subset” served as “typical nontarget exemplars” and all
four exemplars from the “atypical subset” served as “atypical nontarget exemplars”.
For each nontarget exemplar type (either typical or atypical), a half of the four
exemplars remained in the initial pairing of the category they belonged to while the
other half of the four exemplars were randomly paired with other categories (e.g., for
typical exemplars from the category “fruit”: apple-fruit, banana-fruit, cherry-furniture,
and orange-metal). The order of this paring was counterbalanced. A total of 184
nontarget exemplars were then divided into two sets of 92 trials, one set for the PM
block and one for the control block.
Procedure. Participants were tested in groups of 1-6. Participants sat in front
of a computer monitor and were provided a keyboard for their response. All materials
were presented in 18 point Times New Roman font type and in black on a white
background. After signing the consent form approved by the Institutional Review
Board at Washington University in St. Louis, participants were given the instructions
for the lexical decision task and the category judgment task. A few practice trials
followed each instruction. The lexical decision task was used (1) to make it vague in
which context the PM target would appear, and (2) to have some time interval
between the PM instruction and the actual PM task. For the lexical decision task,
participants were instructed to press the y key if the string of letters on the screen was
a real word and the n key if it was not a real word. A fixation point was presented
during the interval between trials. For each trial, the string of letters stayed on the
16

monitor until participants made their response.
For the category judgment task, participants were asked to press the y key if
the word on the center of the screen belonged to the category presented above the
word. Participants were told to press the n key if the word did not belong to the
presented category. Each pairing of the word and the category was presented until
participants made their response. In addition to always presenting the category above
the given word, for each trial, the category was presented with a set of colons
surrounding it from both sides (e.g., :Fruit:) so that it was clear for the participants
which stimulus was the category and which one was the exemplar they needed to
categorize.
After receiving the initial instructions and completing the practice trials for
each task, participants were presented with the first set of lexical decision task and
category judgment task. Before the first set started, the PM instruction was provided
to only the participants who performed the PM block first. The participants were told
to press the q key during the experiment if they saw either “harp”, “taxi”, or
“grandparent”, if they were in the atypical PM targets conditions, or “drum”, “bus”, or
“uncle”, if they were in the typical PM target conditions. The same PM instruction
was provided upon the completion of the first set of lexical decision task and category
judgment task for the participants who performed the control block first.
After receiving the PM instruction, participants who performed the PM block
first summarized the instructions they received on a piece of paper. Participants who
received the control block first were also asked to summarize the appropriate
instructions at this point. Participants were asked to summarize instructions for other
tasks (e. g., lexical decision task) at the appropriate times throughout the experiment
17

and the experimenter always checked the accuracy of summarized instructions,
including the PM targets. After summarizing the PM instruction, participants solved
the lexical decision task for about five minutes. Upon the completion of the lexical
decision task, participants performed the category judgment task. Participants who
received the control block first responded to 92 trials of the category judgment task
while participants who performed the PM block first responded 95 trials of the
category judgment task, including 3 PM target trials. For each participant, upon the
completion of each task, the computer told participants that the task was over and the
next task was to be started.
When the first set of lexical decision task and category judgment task was over,
participants who performed the PM block first were told that “there would be no
secondary task that requires pressing the q key or looking for any specific words (the
PM targets)”. Participants who performed the control block first received the PM
instruction upon the completion of the first set of tasks.
After completing the first set of tasks and the processing of appropriate
instructions, participants solved a second set of lexical decision and category
judgment tasks. After the second category judgment task, participants were given the
post-test questionnaire to check their retrospective memory for the PM targets. Upon
the completion of the questionnaire, participants were debriefed and excused.
Results
Participants’ responses along with the Reaction Times (RTs) to the PM target
exemplars and the nontarget exemplars during the category decision tasks were
recorded. The recorded responses and the RTs to the PM target and the nontarget
exemplars were averaged and analyzed. An alpha level of .05 was set for statistical
18

significance for all statistical analyses, unless noted otherwise. Performance on the
lexical decision task was recorded but was not analyzed.
PM performance. The accuracy of PM performance was obtained by
computing the proportion of correct PM response for the three PM targets. The correct
PM response was pressing the q key upon the presentation of the PM target exemplars.
A 2 x 2 x 2 between subjects measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was conducted
on the mean PM performance with the PM target typicality (typical vs. atypical), the
nontarget typicality (typical vs. atypical), and the block order (PM block first vs.
control block first) as between subjects factors. A significant main effect of nontarget
typicality was found, F(1, 70) = 4.0, MSE = .12, in that the participants were more
likely to perform the PM task when the nontargets were typical exemplars (M=.70)
than when the nontargets were atypical (M=.54). Neither the main effect of PM target
typicality (F<1) nor the interaction of PM target typicality by nontarget typicality
(F=1.17) was significant (see Table 1 for the means).
There was a significant two-way interaction of PM target typicality and block
order, F(1,70)= 8.70, MSE= .12. Post-hoc comparisons revealed that the PM
performance for the typical PM targets (M=.80) was higher than for the atypical PM
targets (M=.48) in the control block first condition, F(1,70)=7.71, MSE=.12, while the
PM performance for the atypical PM targets (M=.67) was only nominally greater than
for the typical PM targets (M=.52) in the PM block first condition, F(1,70)=1.89,
MSE=.12, p=.17. No other effects or interactions were significant.
Category judgment reaction times. We analyzed the RTs to the category
judgments to see if participants were slowed down on the category judgment task
when the PM task was present. PM target exemplars were excluded from this analysis.
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The RTs were trimmed following the methods used by Einstein et al’s (2005). The
RTs from only the correctly judged exemplars in each block (PM vs. control) were
averaged. Also, RTs that were two standard deviations smaller or greater than the
individual means were removed (see Table 2 for the means). Then, the averaged RTs
were entered into appropriate ANOVAs.
First, to validate our experimental manipulation of typicality, we took only the
RTs from the control block from the group who received the control block first and
entered the RTs into a 2 x 2 x 2 mixed repeated measures ANOVA with the response
type (yes vs. no) as a within subjects factor and the PM target typicality and the
nontarget typicality (typical vs. atypical) as between subjects factors. There was a
main effect of response type, in that yes responses (1073 msec) were quicker than the
no responses (1113 msec), F(1, 33) = 7.14, MSE=4226.78. More importantly, there
was a significant main effect of nontarget typicality, F(1,33)=6.86, MSE=4226.78, in
that participants took longer to make category judgments for the atypical nontargets
(1174 msec) than typical nontargets (1012 msec), validating our manipulation and
replicating the classic typicality effect (e.g., Rosch, Simpson, & Miller, 1976). Neither
the main effect of PM target typicality (F=1.17) nor other interactions were significant
(Fs < 1).
Next, we entered the RTs into a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 mixed repeated measures
ANOVA with the response type (yes vs. no) and the block type (PM vs. control) as
within subjects factors and the PM target typicality (typical vs. atypical), the nontarget
typicality (typical vs. atypical), and the block order (PM block first vs. control block
first) as between subjects factors. Again, there was a significant main effect of
response type, F(1,70) = 28.05, MSE=5790.13, in that participants were slower in
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making the no response (1161 msec) than the yes response (1121 msec). More critical
to the present study, there was a significant main effect of block type, F(1, 70) = 44.
27, MSE=5790.13, such that participants were slower at making the category
judgments in the PM block (1184 msec) than in the control block (1097 msec). This
reflects that having to perform the PM task interfered with the category decision task.
There was a significant interaction of block type by nontarget typicality, F(1, 70) =
10.16, MSE= 5790.13. Following post-hoc comparisons found that the interaction was
caused by the greater difference in RTs between the two nontarget conditions (Ms=
1152 and 1041 msec for atypical nontargets and typical nontargets, respectively) on
the control blocks relative to the PM blocks (Ms= 1198 and 1171, respectively).
To identify any potential monitoring cost directly associated with PM
performance in each condition, planned comparisons were made between the PM
block and the control block from each condition. Among the four conditions, except
the (discrepant) condition with the typical PM targets and the atypical nontargets
(F(1,70)=2.63), all three conditions showed significant monitoring: F(1,70)=4.67,
MSE=5790.13

for

the

nondiscrepant

condition

with

atypical

nontargets,

F(1,70)=14.30, MSE=5790.13 for the discrepant condition with typical nontargets,
and F(1, 70)= 47.42, MSE=5790.13 for the nondiscrepant condition with typical
nontargets. Post-hoc comparisons revealed that the monitoring cost for the
nondiscrepant condition with typical nontargets (170 msec) was significantly higher
than that for the discrepant condition with atypical nontargets (40 msec),
F(1,70)=29.19, MSE=5790.13 while the monitoring cost for the discrepant condition
with typical nontargets (91 msec) was only nominally higher than that for the
nondiscrepant condition with atypical nontargets (52 msec), F(1,70)=2.63,
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MSE=5790.13, p=.11. Together with the higher PM performance in the typical
nontarget conditions compared to the atypical nontarget conditions, the monitoring
seems to be more prominent in the conditions where higher PM performance was
observed.
Furthermore, the omnibus ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of PM
target type, F(1,70)=11.78, MSE=5790.13, suggesting that people were on average
faster at making the category judgment on nontargets if the PM targets were atypical
(M=1072 msec) than typical (M=1208 msec), regardless of the typicality of the
nontarget exemplars themselves. This main effect of PM target typicality regardless of
nontarget typicality suggested that having to perform the PM task might influence the
RTs on the category judgment. The main effect of nontarget typicality was only
marginal (F(1,70)=3.01, MSE= 5790.13, p=.087), showing that participants took
longer to respond to atypical nontarget exemplars (M=1175 msec) than to typical
nontarget exemplars (M=1106 msec). This marginally significant effect of nontarget
typicality on RTs also seemed to suggest that performing a PM task might affect the
RTs rather than to reflect unsuccessful manipulation of category typicality.
Category judgment accuracy. Accuracy of the category judgment task was
calculated by computing the proportion of correct judgments for each response type
(yes vs. no) in each block (PM vs. control). Again, PM target exemplars were
excluded in this analysis. Accuracy of the category judgment task was entered into a 2
x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 mixed repeated measures ANOVA with the response type (yes vs. no)
and the block type (PM vs. control) as within subjects factors and the PM target
typicality and the nontarget typicality (typical vs. atypical), and the block order (PM
block first vs. control block first) as between subjects factors. There was a significant
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main effect of response type, F(1, 70) = 8.42, MSE= .002, showing that participants
were more accurate in making the no responses (M=.93) to the category judgment task
than the yes responses (M=.91). There was a significant interaction of response type
by nontarget typicality, F(1, 70) = 17.64, MSE=.002. Post-hoc comparisons revealed
that the category judgment accuracy was higher for the no response (M=.95) than the
yes response (M=.90) for the atypical nontargets (F(1,70)=23.41, MSE=.002) while
the accuracy did not differ as a function of response type for the typical nontargets
(Ms=.92 for no responses and .91 for yes responses). There was no significant effect
of block type, F<1, in that performing the PM task did not interfere with the accuracy
of the category judgment task (Ms=.92). There was a significant interaction of block
type by block order, F(1,70) = 6.16, MSE=.002, showing the accuracy for the PM
blocks differed as a function of block order (Ms=.90 for the control block first
condition and .93 for the PM block first condition) while the accuracy for the control
blocks did not differ as a function of block order (Ms=.92).
Individual differences analysis. Given that significant monitoring may limit
the effect of discrepancy on PM performance, we wanted to see whether the effect of
discrepancy would emerge for individuals for whom monitoring was minimal. One
approach to eliminate monitoring is selectively looking at PM performance from the
individuals that exhibit no or relatively less monitoring (Einstein et al., 2005,
Experiment 4). We used the modified version of the procedure Einstein and
colleagues used. Einstein and colleagues used the difference in mean RTs between the
PM block and the control block (after adjusting for the speedup of the 2nd block due
to practice) to compute the monitoring index for an individual. Given the possibility
of discrepancy emerging on selective PM trials (e.g., later trials in the experiment),
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we wanted to compute separate monitoring indexes diagnostic of PM performance for
each PM trial for each individual. Recently, some studies suggested that the functional
monitoring, the relative slowing down of trials proximal to the PM target, may be a
more sensitive measure of monitoring than the overall monitoring, the relative
slowing down in the PM block compared to the control block as a whole (Scullin,
McDaniel, & Einstein, 2010; Scullin et al., 2010). Thus, we took the 5 nontarget trials
preceding each PM target from the PM block and the matching trials from the control
block. Then, we took the difference between the 5 trials from the PM block and the 5
trials from the control block, after adjusting for the average speed up from the block 1
to the block 2 (the block 1 and 2 could have been either the PM or the control block
based on the counterbalancing order). We then used this difference value to categorize
an individual either as engaged in monitoring (monitors) or not engaged in monitoring
(non-monitors). While there is no clear consensus on the magnitude of slowing down
that defines functional monitoring, we set the arbitrary criterion of less than 30 msec
difference between the PM block and the control block as indicating no monitoring.
Out of 78 participants, 40 individuals were categorized as non-monitors as
they exhibited less than 30 msec monitoring for the 1st PM trial. Thirty-two and 39
individuals were categorized as non-monitors for showing less than 30 msec
monitoring for the second and the third PM trial, respectively. From those who were
categorized as non-monitors, 37 people showed less than 30 msec monitoring for
more than one trial and 24 people showed less than 30 msec monitoring for only one
trial. A close inspection of PM performance from the individuals with less than 30
msec monitoring for each PM trial as a function of discrepancy (discrepant vs.
nondiscrepant conditions, collapsed across typical and atypical PM targets) revealed
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nominally higher PM performance in the discrepant condition for all three PM trials
(Ms= .61 for the first, .73 for the second, and .67 for the third PM trials) than that in
the nondiscrepant condition (Ms=.47, .50, .56, respectively). These differences and the
averaged PM performance across trials (Ms= .65 for the discrepant condition and .49
for the nondiscrepant condition), however, were not statistically significant (Fs < 1.89)
according to the planned comparisons conducted.
Discussion
To summarize the results from the Experiment 1, first, we found that people
are more likely to perform the PM task if their nontarget exemplars were typical than
atypical, regardless of the PM target typicality. These results are not readily explained
by any of the current theories of PM retrieval, most of which focus on the property of
the PM target rather than that of nontargets (McDaniel, 1995; McDaniel & Einstein,
2000; McDaniel et al., 2004; Smith, 2003). The familiarity view (McDaniel) predicts
higher PM performance for PM targets with high typicality while the discrepancyplus-search view (McDaniel & Einstein) predicts higher PM performance for PM
targets with the mismatching typicality to the typicality of the nontargets. Failures to
find any significant effect of PM target typicality and interaction of PM target
typicality by nontarget typicality does not support either the familiarity view or the
discrepancy-plus-search view (Einstein & McDaniel; McDaniel et al.).
Rather, two patterns of the results seem to be consistent with the PAM theory
(Smith, 2003; Smith & Bayen, 2004; Smith et al., 2007). One piece of support for the
PAM theory is that there was no effect of PM target typicality on PM performance.
While the difficulty of recognition check for PM targets with different typicality may
differ, the PAM theory would possibly not expect that PM target typicality would
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influence PM performance given the small number (three) of PM targets used in
Experiment 1. No substantial difference in recognition check difficulty then could
have led to no difference in PM performance as a function of PM target typicality.
Another pattern that is consistent with the PAM theory (Smith, 2003; Smith &
Bayen, 2004; Smith et al., 2007) is the finding of PM performance being associated
with monitoring. Significantly more monitoring associated with high PM performance
in the typical nontarget conditions seems to be consistent with the PAM theory, which
argues that monitoring is necessary for successful PM performance (e.g., Smith).
While the PAM theory does not specify in which circumstances people engage in
monitoring, an explanation can be derived from the theory to account for the data.
Given that monitoring is resource-consuming, it is possible that engaging in a task
demanding less resources, such as making a category judgment for typical exemplars,
participants might be more likely to engage in monitoring. More monitoring with the
relatively spared resources in the typical nontarget condition would enhance PM
performance in that condition. Participants in the atypical nontarget conditions, on the
other hand, may have had less resources available given this category judgment task
was more demanding (as evidence by longer RTs in categorizing atypical exemplars).
Thus, these participants may have had less monitoring. In return, these participants’
PM performance was lower compared to that of the participants in the typical
nontarget conditions who could monitor more. Related to this possibility, Marsh and
Hicks (1998) reported that their participants’ PM performance was lower if they had
to simultaneously perform a task that is more resource-demanding (e.g., random
number generation at a fast pace) than a task that is less resource-demanding task (e.g.,
random number generation at a slow pace). Although Marsh and Hicks did not have
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the RT measures with which to compare to our results, it seems possible that when
their participants had to engage in a more resource-demanding task, participants might
have been less likely to engage in monitoring, which resulted in a lower level of PM
performance.
Despite the absence of clear evidence for the discrepancy-plus-search view, it
seemed premature to completely rule it out. Rather, we reasoned that the monitoring
could have eliminated the chance for discrepancy to facilitate PM performance in
Experiment 1. Indeed, when we selectively looked at the people with no/minimal
monitoring we found that these participants’ PM performance was nominally higher
in the discrepant conditions than in the nondiscrepant conditions. Hence, the results
suggest that discrepancy-plus-search processes can support PM performance when
one is not monitoring. However, the results also suggest that, when a person
constantly looks for the PM target during the ongoing activity, he might not need to
use a mechanism that spontaneously leads one to recognize the PM target and retrieve
the PM intention.
One possible reason for the significant monitoring in Experiment 1 is the
number of PM targets we used. Cohen, Jaudas, and Gollwitzer (2008) have found that,
when people have to remember more than one PM target, they are likely to engage in
monitoring behaviors by showing linearly increasing monitoring cost for increasing
number of PM target. Also, Einstein and colleagues (2005, Experiment 3) found
significantly more monitoring when people have to remember 6 PM targets than 1 PM
target. Thus, while we succeeded in controlling for the potential ceiling in Experiment
1 by using three PM targets, by doing so, we might have encouraged monitoring
behaviors in our participants. Hence, in Experiment 2, we attempted to eliminate the
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monitoring by implementing some changes, such as decreasing the number of PM
targets.
Experiment 2
Given that the significant monitoring may have interfered with the effect of
discrepancy on PM performance to emerge in Experiment 1, the following changes
were made for Experiment 2. First, we reduced the number of PM targets from three
to two. We wanted more than one PM target trial to allow us to observe the effect of
discrepancy. Yet, we were reluctant to repeatedly present the same PM target multiple
times because the repetition may alter the integrity of category typicality of atypical
PM targets and subsequently discrepancy experienced with those PM targets. For
example, when an atypical PM target is presented repeatedly, participants might find
the repeated atypical PM target as typical over time, which may then prohibit
participants to find that repeated atypical PM target discrepant from the list of typical
nontarget exemplars. Also, we noticed that while having to remember three PM
targets stimulate significant monitoring, having to remember two targets stimulated
only marginally significant monitoring in Cohen and colleagues’ study (2008).
Together with Lee and McDaniel’s (2010) finding that showed no monitoring with
two PM targets, we reasoned that it might be possible that two PM targets would not
stimulate any significant monitoring.
Secondly, we changed the PM instruction so that it specified the context in
which PM targets to appear: While not specifying the context in which PM targets
will appear could have reduced the chance of monitoring when PM targets appear in
Experiment 1, it could also have led participants to guess the context in which the PM
targets would appear. After solving the first set of tasks, participants might have
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figured out the structure of the task set and tried to guess when the PM targets might
appear. For example, after completing the first set of tasks, consisted of the lexical
decision task and the category judgment task, participant may expect to have another
lexical decision task followed by another category judgment task. If they do not
encounter any PM targets during the second lexical decision task (after encountering
no PM target during the first set of tasks), participants may assume that the PM targets
will appear during the second category judgment task if they will ever appear. With
this reasoning, some participants may have engaged in the monitoring on the onset of
the second category judgment task. The higher PM performance for the typical PM
targets when the control block was first presented in Experiment 1 hinted at this
possibility and we wanted to eliminate this possible monitoring strategy. We reasoned
that by specifying the PM context, we may reduce the possibility of people using the
contextual information to regulate their monitoring behavior. Also to further
investigate any strategic regulation of monitoring behaviors, such as deciding to
monitor if a task is perceived to be easy (as hinted in Experiment 1 by faster RTs to
typical nontargets), we added in the monitoring strategy questionnaire at the end of
the experiment.
In addition to specifying the PM context, we increased the total number of
nontargets during the PM block (from 92 trials in Experiment 1 to 148 in Experiment
2). More importantly, we increased the number of nontarget trials preceding the first
PM target (from 30 trials in Experiment 1 to 103 trials in Experiment 2). Scullin and
colleagues (2010) successfully eliminated monitoring by presenting 500 nontarget
trials prior to the first PM target presentation. Because the numbers of normed
categories and their exemplars are limited and repeating those items, especially the
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atypical exemplars, would hinder the manipulation of discrepancy, the present
stimulus set did not allow us to match the number of trials preceding the first PM
target to that of Scullin and colleagues’ study. However, by increasing the number of
nontargets preceding the first PM target, we hoped that participants might disengage
from the monitoring they may have initiated at the beginning of the category
judgment task, possibly prior to the presentation of first PM target. Furthermore, we
reasoned that increasing the number of nontargets preceding the PM target may
increase the magnitude of discrepancy experienced.
Methods
Participants and design. A total of 88 participants from the Washington
University in St. Louis community participated in the experiment in exchange of a
partial course credit or monetary compensation. The design was the same as
Experiment 1, a 2 x 2 x 2 mixed design with the PM target typicality and the
nontarget typicality (typical vs. atypical) as between subjects factors and the block
type (PM vs. control) as a within subjects factor.
Materials and procedure. Materials for Experiment 2 were the same as in
Experiment 1, except some minor changes described below. First, the number of PM
targets was reduced from three to two. PM targets for the typical PM target conditions
were “drum” and “bus” while PM targets for the atypical PM target conditions were
“harp” and “taxi”. The mean length and the mean HAL frequency were 3.5 letters and
9.76 for the typical PM targets and 4 letters and 7.67 for the atypical PM targets,
respectively. Also, to increase the number of nontargets in the PM block, the control
block was shortened from total of 92 trials to 36 trials. 56 trials from the control block
were added into the PM block, making the PM block to have the total of 148
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nontarget trials. The numbers of trials in the corresponding lexical decision tasks were
also altered accordingly.
Procedure for Experiment 2 had several minor changes as well. First, the
shortened control block always preceded the PM block. Because we were limited in
the number of stimuli we can use under this paradigm, we could not counterbalance
the presentation order of the PM block and the control block with the same number of
trials in each block to calculate monitoring cost. Thus, by always presenting the
control block prior to the PM block, we could measure the baseline of each
participant’s category judgment task independent of any PM intention. After
performing a minute of the lexical decision task, participants performed 36 trials of
the category decision task (the control block). Then, participants were presented with
the PM instruction with the specification of the context in which the PM targets will
appear. After each instruction for a task, participants were told to write down the
instruction to make sure that they understood the instruction. Participants turned in
their instruction summary and then upon the examination of the summary by the
experimenter, they were told to press the 1 key to proceed. Then, for 5 minutes,
participants performed another round of the lexical decision task. Upon the
completion of the lexical decision task, participants solved 150 trials of the category
judgment task in which the PM targets were presented on the 104 th and the 140th trials.
At the end of all the tasks, participants received a questionnaire on potential strategy
use on monitoring behaviors during the experiment.
Results
The same response measures, such as the key responses and the RTs, were
recorded and analyzed. An alpha level of .05 was set for statistical significance for all
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statistical analyses, unless noted otherwise. Performance on the lexical decision task,
which was used as a distractor task, was not analyzed.
PM performance. The accuracy of PM performance was derived by
computing the proportion of correct PM response for the two PM targets. The correct
PM response was pressing the q key upon the presentation of a PM target exemplar. A
2 x 2 between subjects ANOVA with the PM target typicality and the nontarget
typicality (typical vs. atypical) as between subjects factors was conducted on the
mean PM performance (see Table 3 for the means). There was no main effect of PM
target typicality or nontarget typicality (Fs < 1). Also, while the nominal difference
was in the direction predicted as a priori by the discrepancy-plus-search view, such
that the mean PM performance in the discrepant conditions (M=.77) was higher than
that in the nondiscrepant conditions (M=.73), there was no significant interaction of
PM target typicality by nontarget typicality (F < 1).
While the PM performance difference between the discrepant conditions and
the nondiscrepant conditions was only nominal, an inspection of the data led us to
reason that the effect of discrepancy might be different from the first PM target to the
second PM target for the following reason. At the beginning of the task in which the
PM target is to appear, people may engage in monitoring. Based on the finding from
Experiment 1 showing more monitoring in the typical nontarget conditions, it could
be possible that the participants in the less resource-demanding conditions (e.g.,
typical nontarget conditions) engage in the monitoring more so than the participants in
the relatively more resource-demanding conditions (e.g., atypical nontarget
conditions). This differential engagement in monitoring then may lead to differential
PM performance: more monitoring may lead to higher PM performance in the typical
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nontarget conditions. After responding to the first PM target, participants may
disengage from the monitoring, thinking the chance of encountering another PM
target is low. If participants were to disengage from the monitoring, then PM
performance could be supported by the discrepancy-plus-search processes.
Consequently, discrepancy may then affect PM performance primarily for the second
PM target.
To test this idea, we conducted two separate between subjects ANOVAs on
mean PM performance: one for the first PM target and another for the second PM
target. For both ANOVAs, the PM target typicality and the nontarget typicality
(typical vs. atypical) were entered as between subjects factors. For the first PM target,
while there were no significant main effects or interaction (Fs < 1), there was a
nominal difference between the conditions with atypical nontargets (M=.68) and the
conditions with typical nontargets (M=.82). Notice this nominal difference may reflect
the possible selective monitoring behavior as described above. For the second PM
target, there were no significant main effects or interaction (Fs <1). Yet, interestingly
enough, there was a nominal difference on mean PM performance as a function of
discrepancy: PM performance for the second PM target was nominally higher in the
discrepant conditions (M=.80) than in the nondiscrepant conditions (M=.70).
Category judgment reaction times. To investigate any potential slowing down
of the category judgment task due to the PM intention, RTs to make the category
judgment task were analyzed. The trimming was done in the same way as described in
Experiment 1. Averaged RTs were entered into a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 mixed measures
ANOVA with the response type (yes vs. no) and the block type (PM vs. control) as
within subjects factors and the PM target and the nontarget typicality (typical vs.
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atypical) as between subjects factors (see Table 4 for the mean). There was a main
effect of response type, (F(1, 84)=35.35, MSE=6412.50), in that participants were
faster in correctly judging an exemplar belonging to a given category (1082 msec),
thus making a yes response, than judging a nonexemplar not belonging to the given
category (1141 msec). Also, there was a significant main effect of block type,
F(1,84)=196.91, MSE=6412.50, in that participants were faster in making the
category judgments in the control block (1036 msec) than in the PM block (1188
msec). Also, there was a main effect of nontarget typicality, F(1,84)=14.17, MSE=
6412.50, showing faster reaction times for the typical nontargets (1036 msec) than for
the atypical nontargets (1187 msec). Note that this result, again, reflects that the
experimental manipulation of category typicality was successful. No other effects or
interactions were significant.
Planned comparisons were made to look at the monitoring cost for each
condition. All of the four conditions were found to have a significant monitoring cost,
the smallest F value being F(1,84)=29.52, MSE=6412.50. Post-hoc comparisons
revealed that the monitoring cost for the discrepant condition with typical nontargets
(184 msec) was significantly higher than that for the nondiscrepant condition with
atypical nontargets (132 msec), F(1,84)=4.64, MSE=6412.50. The monitoring cost for
the discrepant condition with atypical nontargets (138 msec) did not differ
significantly from that of the nondiscrepant condition with typical nontargets (155
msec), F <1.
In addition to the overall monitoring measures, we wanted to see if the
functional monitoring cost differed as a function of discrepancy. Furthermore, we
were curious if the functional monitoring cost may show differential monitoring
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strategies engaged for the first and the second PM targets that showed differential data
patterns. Following Scullin et al.’s (2010) procedure, we entered averaged RTs from
the five trials preceding each PM target and corresponding trials from the control
block (the last five of 36 trials) into a 3 x 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA with the
trial type (control, first PM, and second PM) as a within subjects factor and the PM
target typicality and the nontarget typicality (typical vs. atypical) as between subjects
factors. There was a main effect

of nontarget typicality,

F(1,84)=6.95,

MSE=108198.85, showing that participants were faster at making category judgments
for the typical nontarget exemplars (1043 msec) than atypical nontarget exemplars
(1149 msec). Also, there was a main effect of trial type, F(1,168)=28.58,
MSE=24955.27. Planned comparisons revealed higher RTs for the five trials
preceding the first and the second PM trials (Ms= 1144 and 1152 msec, respectively)
compared to the control trials (M=992 msec), F(1, 168)=40.74 and 45.14, MSE=
24955.27, respectively. These results indicate that having the PM intention slowed
down the ongoing activity in the PM block compared to the control block. No other
effects were significant.
Further comparisons found that the functional monitoring cost did not differ as
a function of discrepancy for the first and the second PM targets, or as a function of
nontarget typicality for the first PM target, Fs< 1.55. However, the functional
monitoring cost for the second PM trial was marginally higher in the typical nontarget
conditions (M=192 msec) than in the atypical nontarget conditions (M=128 msec),
F(1,168)=3.61, MSE=24955.27, p=.06.
Category judgment accuracy. Accuracy of the category judgment task was
computed by taking the proportion of correct judgments for each response type (yes
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vs. no) in each block (PM vs. control). PM target exemplars were excluded in this
analysis. Accuracy of the category judgment task was entered into a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2
repeated measures ANOVA with the response type (yes vs. no) and the block type
(PM vs. control) as within subjects factors and the PM target typicality and the
nontarget typicality (typical vs. atypical) as between subjects factors. There was a
significant effect of block type, F(1,84)=25.66, MSE=.002, in that participants
correctly judged more exemplars in the control block (M=.96) than in the PM block
(M=.94), suggesting that having PM intention may hurt the performance accuracy of
ongoing activity. Also, there was a significant main effect of nontarget typicality,
F(1,84)=5.68, MSE=.002, in that participants made more correct category decisions
for the typical nontarget exemplars (M=.96) than for the atypical nontarget exemplars
(M=.94). This effect, again, proves that our manipulation of exemplar typicality was
successful. No other effects or interactions were significant.
Individual differences analysis. With the same reasoning and procedure used
in Experiment 1, we computed an individual’s monitoring index for each PM target.
We used less than 200 msec difference between the PM block and the control block as
an arbitrary cut off point in categorizing people exhibiting less monitoring than the
others. We could not use the same cut off point used in Experiment 1 because the
average individual monitoring index was higher in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1.
For the first PM trial, a total of 12 people were categorized as exhibiting less
monitoring: eight people from the discrepant conditions and four from the
nondiscrepant conditions. For the second PM trial, a total of ten people were
categorized as exhibiting less monitoring: four from the discrepant conditions and six
from the nondiscrepant conditions. Only two people showed monitoring less than 200
36

msec for both PM trials. The mean PM performance for the first PM target was the
same between the discrepant and the nondiscrepant conditions (Ms=.75). The mean
PM performance for the second PM was nominally higher in the discrepant condition
(M=1.0) than in the nondiscrepant condition (M=.50).
Discussion
In Experiment 2, we found a number of nominal, but interesting, data patterns.
First, we found further support for selective monitoring behaviors found in
Experiment 1. There was a higher PM performance in the typical nontarget conditions
(M=.82) than in the atypical nontarget conditions (M=.68) for the first PM target. The
functional monitoring cost for the first PM trial did not differ as a function of
nontarget typicality, possibly because both discrepant and nondiscrepant conditions
already exhibited significant monitoring. Still, higher overall monitoring cost for the
typical nontarget conditions, together with the higher PM performance in the typical
nontarget conditions, suggests that the property of nontargets (e.g., perceived task
difficulty induced by processing typical/atypical category exemplars) might be a
factor that people utilize to regulate their monitoring behaviors.
Secondly, we found some support showing discrepancy facilitating PM
performance. There was a nominal difference on PM performance for the second PM
target as a function of discrepancy (M=.80 for the discrepant conditions and M=.70
for the nondiscrepant conditions). Also, while only a very small sample size was used
(total of ten participants in the discrepant and the nondiscrepant conditions), the
individual differences analysis showed that the mean PM performance for the second
PM trial in the discrepant conditions was higher than that in the nondiscrepant
conditions when we selectively looked at the participants with less monitoring. Given
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that these patterns were predicted as a priori by the discrepancy-plus-search view
(McDaniel & Einstein, 2000; McDaniel et al., 2004), we reject the assumption that the
unsuccessful manipulation of discrepancy led to the nominal difference between the
discrepant conditions and the nondiscrepant conditions. Instead, we suggest another
factor might have been responsible for this nominal difference. While certain features
of Experiment 2 were implemented to eliminate any monitoring (e.g., smaller number
of PM targets), we failed to minimize the monitoring throughout the experiment.
Subsequently, the presence of monitoring could have limited the full emergence of
discrepancy processes, leading only to nominally different PM performance between
the discrepant and the nondiscrepant conditions. This failure to eliminate monitoring
precludes any decisive conclusions about the role of discrepancy on PM performance.
General Discussion
By manipulating the category typicality of PM target and nontarget exemplars,
we attempted to extend Lee and McDaniel’s (2010) finding supporting discrepancyplus-search processes in PM performance. The experimental manipulation of category
typicality was successful, as indicated by the classic finding of a typicality effect (e.g.,
shorter RTs to typical exemplars than to atypical exemplars during a task requiring
category information; Rosch, Simpson, & Miller, 1976). Unfortunately, however, we
failed to eliminate monitoring that can mask the full emergence of discrepancy in PM
performance. Below we discuss the findings of the study, possible shortcomings of the
data, and suggestions for future studies.
In Experiment 1, we found higher PM performance in the typical nontarget
conditions (M=.70) than in the atypical nontarget conditions (M=.54), independent of
PM target typicality. Also, the higher PM performance was preceded by significant
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higher monitoring cost. This finding of higher PM performance in the typical
nontarget conditions in the presence of significant monitoring was partially replicated
in Experiment 2 for the first PM target. These data patterns seem to suggest that the
property (e.g., the ease of processing) of nontargets may have determined PM
performance, possibly through regulating monitoring behaviors.
Although the PAM theory (e.g., Smith, 2003) does not explicitly predict higher
PM performance in the typical nontarget conditions, one may develop an explanation
within the PAM theory for the data patterns just described. Given the shorter RTs to
typical nontarget exemplars than to atypical nontarget exemplars during the control
block in Experiment 1 and 2, along with the classic findings on the typicality effect,
one may assume that resource demands for the processing of the typical nontargets
were less than that for the processing of the atypical nontargets. Given participants in
the typical nontarget conditions had more resources available than participants in the
atypical nontarget conditions, the PAM theory may suggest that the higher PM
performance in the former could have been facilitated by monitoring afforded by
spared resources. In line with this idea, studies have found higher PM performance in
the condition where participants are asked to perform a task that is relatively less
demanding compared to PM performance in the condition where participants are
asked to perform a task that is relatively more demanding (e.g., Marsh & Hicks, 1998).
One interesting question to follow-up is whether or not people can recognize that they
have spared resources to engage in resource-consuming monitoring behaviors to
perform a PM task in a less resource-demanding setting. It is possible that people in
the typical nontarget exemplar conditions voluntarily engaged in monitoring after they
realized the task was easy. Another possibility is that spared resources in the typical
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nontarget exemplar conditions allowed monitoring to be efficient in that condition. In
the former case, one may emphasize the importance of understanding the task demand
of ongoing activities while in the latter one may emphasize the importance of
decreasing the task demand of ongoing activities on performing a PM task.
In addition to the question how people may capitalize on the spared resources
when performing a PM task, another factor to consider for future study is whether
individual differences play a role in the use of monitoring strategies. Particularly in
Experiment 1, we observed that individuals engaged differently in monitoring
behaviors: some participants exhibited less than 30 msec monitoring for all three PM
trials and others exhibited significant monitoring for all trials while the rest of the
participants varied in their monitoring behaviors. Although it is premature to argue
that these data indicate stable individual differences in engaging in monitoring
behaviors, we suggest that, at least for the people who showed consistently less/more
monitoring over three PM trials, some individual differences could have led them to
employ a particular strategy to monitor or not to monitor. Unfortunately, we could not
further test this idea as the paradigm was not designed to investigate the individual
difference factors and how they may influence monitoring strategies, and
subsequently, PM performance in different settings. Future studies are needed to
better understand this relationship between individual difference factors and the use of
monitoring strategies.
In Experiment 1 and 2, we failed to find significant support for the
discrepancy-plus-search view (Einstein & McDaniel, 2000; McDaniel et al., 2004).
One possibility for the lack of a significant effect of discrepancy on PM performance
is that experimental manipulation of category typicality of nontargets and PM targets
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was ineffective. This is unlikely for the following reasons. First, pilot studies
conducted prior to Experiment 1 and 2, using the same stimuli set as Experiment 1
and 2, found that participants rated the typical exemplars more typical than the
atypical exemplars. Second, RT to make the category judgments in Experiment 1 and
2, along with the response in the pilot studies, showed shorter RTs toward the typical
exemplars than the atypical exemplars. Replicating the classical typicality effect (e. g.,
Rosch, Simpson, & Miller, 1976), these RT measures indicate that the experimental
manipulation was effective in inducing different levels of typicality between two
kinds of exemplars (typical vs. atypical). Lastly, differential PM performance as a
function of nontarget typicality (higher PM performance in the typical nontarget
conditions than in the atypical nontarget conditions) also suggests that the
experimental manipulation differentiated conditions (typical vs. atypical nontarget
conditions). Thus, the failure to find an effect of discrepancy on PM performance was
likely not because the manipulation of typicality was too weak.
While the experimental manipulation of typicality was successful, it remains
possible that the processing difference between typical versus atypical PM targets was
not substantial enough to induce a discrepancy. However, a number of data patterns
from Experiment 1 and 2 leads us to consider another possibility. First, there was a
nominal difference in PM performance as a function of discrepancy in Experiment 2,
particularly for the second PM target (Ms=.80 and .70 for the discrepant and the
nondiscrepant conditions, respectively). Given that the aforementioned pattern of
higher PM performance in the discrepant conditions was predicted a priori by the
discrepancy-plus-search view (McDaniel et al., 2004), we find it unlikely that the
nominal difference was random. Rather, we entertain the possibility that the
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monitoring might have minimized the chance for the discrepancy-plus-search
processes to support any PM performance.
According to the multi-process theory (Einstein et al., 2005), discrepancyplus-search processes support the recognition of PM target and the retrieval of PM
intention when one is not engaged in the monitoring processes. Given the presence of
significant monitoring in Experiment 1 and 2 (as indicated by cost), participants could
have performed the PM task without the support from the discrepancy-plus-search
processes. When participants disengage from monitoring, however, discrepancy-plussearch processes may emerge to facilitate the recognition of PM target and the
retrieval of PM intention. The nominally higher PM performance in the discrepant
conditions for the second PM target in Experiment 2 may reflect this possibility. Also
reflecting this possibility was the higher PM performance in the discrepant conditions
than in the nondiscrepant conditions when we selectively looked at the people with
less monitoring (particularly in Experiment 1).
Though we implemented some features to minimize monitoring, we could not
eliminate monitoring in the present paradigm. Though we decreased the number of
PM targets from three in Experiment 1 to two in Experiment 2, monitoring was still
present. Also, presenting more than 100 nontarget trials prior to the first PM target
presentation in Experiment 2 failed to eliminate monitoring. To control for monitoring
in a future study using this paradigm, we plan to limit the number of PM targets to
one and to increase the number of nontarget trials preceding the first PM target
presentation. Cohen and colleagues’(2008) finding of marginally significant
monitoring cost even with two PM targets suggests that the use of two different PM
targets might have been sufficient to encourage people to monitor in the present
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paradigm. By using one PM target for several target trials, one may decrease the
likelihood of people engaging in monitoring behaviors while controlling for the
ceiling on PM performance. Additionally, by presenting many nontarget trials prior to
the first PM target, one may minimize the likelihood of people staying engaged in
monitoring as in Scullin and colleagues’ (2010) study, which showed minimal
monitoring for the PM target presented following 500 nontarget trials. Given the
limited number of normed categories and exemplars, the present paradigm could have
only 103 nontarget trials precede the first PM target, which is a far smaller number
Scullin and colleagues used. Moreover, the present study could not increase the
number of nontarget trials by repetition because the repetition of atypical exemplars
may easily compromise the manipulation of discrepancy in certain conditions:
presenting a typical PM target after presenting a list of “repeated” atypical exemplars
may no longer serve as a discrepant condition given that the repetition may alter the
ease of processing repeated atypical exemplars. For one possible way to increase the
number of nontargets preceding the first PM target without repeating the same
nontarget exemplars, one may begin the PM block with moderately typical exemplars
for a number of trials, and then, present typical or atypical nontargets to induce
discrepancy. By doing so, we may lower the likelihood of people staying engaged in
monitoring until the presentation of first PM target without contaminating the
integrity of category typicality of exemplars by repetition.
A PM target event is never presented in isolation, but is processed under the
influence of many different factors (e.g., resource demanded by an ongoing activity)
in real life settings. Yet, often, many theories make predictions, with the primary focus
on the property of PM target. Perhaps more fruitful predictions may be made if some
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of the existing theories start to incorporate how the property of PM targets interacts
with other factors that may influence PM performance, such as the property of
nontargets or individual differences in employing monitoring strategies.
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Table 1. Mean proportion of correct PM performance as a function of the PM target
typicality and the notarget typicality. Standard deviations in parenthesis.

Typical nontarget
Atypical nontarget

Typical PM target
.77 (.27)
.51 (.37)

Atypical PM target
.62 (.39)
.53 (.41)

Table 2. Mean Reaction Times (in milliseconds) for the PM Block and the control
block as a function of the PM target typicality and the nontarget typicality. Standard
deviations in parenthesis. T- referring to Typical and A- referring to Atypical. –list
referring to nontargets.
T-target in T-list A-target in T-list T-target in A-list A-Target in A-list
PM Block
Control Block

1273 (221)
1103 (179)

1070 (148)
979 (130)

1249 (223)
1209 (181)

1147 (159)
1095 (191)

Table 3. Mean proportion of correct PM performance as a function of the PM target
typicality and the notarget typicality. Standard deviation in parenthesis.
Typical PM target
Typical nontarget
Atypical nontarget

.75 (.40)
.77 (.25)

Atypical PM target
.80 (.33)
.71 (.37)

Table 4. Mean Reaction Times (in milliseconds) for the PM Block and the control
block as a function of the PM target typicality and the nontarget typicality. Standard
deviations in parenthesis. T- referring to Typical and A- referring to Atypical. –list
referring to nontargets.
T-target in T-list A-target in T-list T-target in A-list A-Target in A-list
PM Block
1098 (135)
Control Block
943 (101)

1121 (169)
983 (151)
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1285 (227)
1101 (208)

1248 (282)
1116 (247)

